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The Impact of Columbus Board of Education v. Penick and Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman on Proving Segregative Intent in School
Desegregation Cases
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado' the Supreme
Court ruled that where it has been proven that school authorities have
pursued an intentional segregative policy in a "meaningful portion" of
their school district, the burden is on school authorities to prove that
their actions as to other segregated schools in that system are not also
motivated by segregative intent. The Court, however, did not set forth
specific criteria for determining what constitutes a segregated school in
the de jure context. It merely stated, "What is or is not a segregated
school will necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case.'"2
The question left open in Keyes-what findings of constitutional viola-
tions will suffice to justify a systemwide remedy-was the principal is-
sue addressed in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick3 and Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman (hereinafter referred to as Dayton If).'
In both of these cases the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals which ruled that (1) in 1954, when Brown v. Board of
Education (hereinafter referred to as Brown 1)' was decided, the Co-
lumbus and Dayton school boards had been intentionally operating
dual systems in a substantial part of each district; (2) since that time
these boards had been under a continuous constitutional obligation to
disassemble these dual systems but they had failed to discharge their
duty; and (3) in the intervening years the boards' actions and practices
had intentionally aggravated racial separation in the schools.6 By af-
firming the lower courts' findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Supreme Court endorsed the novel concept of allowing school desegre-
gation plaintiffs to use evidence of past purposeful segregation existing
in 1954 (when Brown I was decided), to prove, subject to rebuttal, that
any current segregative impact was inspired by an unconstitutional,
segregative purpose. The impact of the Court's decisions in Keyes and
Columbus on the ability of future plaintiffs to prove purposeful segre-
gation in school districts having no history of statutorily compelled seg-
1. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
2. Id. at 196.
3. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
4. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 583 F.2d 787, 795, 799, 815, 818 (6th Cir. 1978).
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regation7 is yet to be determined.
THE COLUMBUS CASE
In 1973 fourteen students in the Columbus, Ohio school system
brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Columbus Board of Education and the State Board of Education,8
claiming that the Boards and their officials had pursued, and were pur-
suing, a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and
perpetuating racial segregation in the public schools in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.9 Evidence revealed that prior to the filing of
this action in 1973, and in the intervening years that followed, the Co-
lumbus public schools were predominantly segregated by race. A 1976
survey concluded that over 32% of the 96,000 students in the system
were black. Nevertheless, during the 1975-76 school year, about 70% of
all the students attended schools which were populated by either 80-
100% black or white students; over 73% of the black administrators
were assigned to schools with 70-100% black student bodies; and about
96% of the ninety-two schools which were 80-100% white had no black
administrators assigned to them. 0 The district court reviewed both the
recent and the remote history of the Columbus school system, consider-
ing such factors as segregative optional attendance zones, segregative
faculty and administrative hiring and assignments, discontiguous at-
tendance zones, deliberate drawing of some attendance zones to allow
white students to avoid black schools, and selection of sites for new
school construction in areas where racially segregated schools
foreseeably could be maintained." The court was particularly swayed
by the proof of notice to the Columbus Board of Education. Various
segments of the community, notably black parents and civic organiza-
7. In 1881, by resolution, the Columbus Board abolished separate schools for black chil-
dren. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 235 (E.D. Ohio 1977).
8. The district court's finding of liability against the State Board of Education rested prima-
rily upon the Board's failure to order the local Columbus Board to perform its constitutional duty
to operate a school system which was not segregated by race. Id. at 262-64.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found no evidence of any act by the State Board requiring
the Columbus Board to pursue segregative policies, nor did they find evidence that affirmative
actions were taken by the State Board to desegregate the Columbus schools. In light of these
considerations and others, the court of appeals remanded the case as it pertained to the State
Board for more specific findings of fact. 583 F.2d at 818.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
10. 429 F. Supp. at 240.
I1. Id. at 260. Out of 103 schools constructed between 1950 and 1975, 87 opened with ra-
cially identifiable student bodies. Seventy-five of the 87 new schools remained racially identifiable
at the time of trial. Id. at 241.
220
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tions, repeatedly voiced concern and outrage over the continual overt
acts and omissions of the Board which ultimately fostered segregation
in the schools.' 2 Based upon these and other findings of fact, the court
concluded that at the time of trial, the racial segregation in the Colum-
bus school system was a direct result of both the Board's recent and
remote intentional, segregative acts and omissions in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 3
In 1977, while Columbus was waiting to be heard by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court heard Dayton 14 and ruled that
in those cases where mandatory racial segregation no longer exists, it
must first be determined if the school board intended to, and did in
fact, discriminate on a systemwide basis before a systemwide remedy
may be instituted. ' After this decision, the Columbus Board filed a
motion requesting that the district court modify its findings and judg-
ment in light of Dayton .16
The district judge carefully reviewed the specific language employed
by the Court in the Dayton I opinion, distinguished the facts in
Dayton I from the facts in Columbus, and reiterated its previous find-
ings of de jure and intentional systemwide segregation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court.'
7
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Board
argued that at the time of trial its operation of a segregated school sys-
tem was not done with any racially discriminatory purpose, and that
whatever unconstitutional conduct it may have been guilty of in the
past, such conduct at no time had systemwide segregative impact.' 8 In
the opinion, written by Justice White and joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens (Justice Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger concurred only in the judgment), the Court ruled that there was
no reason to disturb the court of appeals' ruling that the past and pres-
12. If there exists in this case a factor which distinguishes it from some other northern
desegregation cases, it is the proof adduced concerning notice to the Columbus Board of
Education. Various segments of the community, notably black parents and civic organiza-
tions, have repeatedly and articulately vocalized concern, anger or dismay concerning both
overtly segregative actions and lost integrative opportunities. . . .The local NAACP group,
Columbus Urban League, Columbus Metropolitan League of Women Voters, Columbus
Area Civil Rights Council, Columbus Metropolitan Council on Quality Integrated Educa-
tion, the Columbus Board-sponsored Ohio State University Advisory Commission on
Problems Facing the Columbus Public Schools, and officials of the Ohio State Board of Edu-
cation, all called attention to the problem and made certain curative recommendations.
Id. at 255.
13. Id. at 264-67.
14. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
15. 1d. at 418-20.
16. 583 F.2d at 796.
17. Id. at 787, 818.
18. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 (1979).
3
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ent conduct of the Columbus Board of Education was not only inspired
by an unconstitutional segregative purpose, but also had current segre-
gative impact that was sufficiently systemwide to warrant the remedy
ordered by the district court. 19
Before the Supreme Court, the Columbus Board of Education again
argued that a systemwide remedy was contrary to the teachings of Day-
ton I, because whatever unconstitutional conduct it may have been
guilty of in the past, such conduct at no time in the past or present had
systemwide impact. The Board also argued that because segregated
schooling was not commanded by state law, and because all schools
were neither totally black nor totally white in 1954, the district court's
findings were unwarranted.2" The Supreme Court answered both of
these arguments after reviewing the record and pointed out that the
Columbus public schools were "officially" segregated by race in 1954,
and subsequent acts and omissions by the Board had perpetuated racial
segregation. Applying the doctrine of Keyes, the Court expressed rea-
soning that proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of
separate black schools in a substantial part of a school system is in itself
prima facie proof of a dual school system, and absent sufficient evi-
dence to rebut this presumption, which the Board did not produce, the
plaintiffs should prevail.
2'
The Columbus Board" of Education also contended that the lower
courts misapplied the prevailing law. The Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that the doctrines of Washington v. Davis,22 Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,23 and Keyes v.
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado24 were satisfied by the decision
below.
19. Id. at 450, 453-54.
20. Id at 454-57.
21. Id. at 467-69.
22. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court in Davis made an effort to clarify the difference between
discriminatory purpose and differential effect: it emphasized that "the basic equal protection prin-
ciple that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." The majority stated that the Court had "not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportion-
ate impact," and that while "disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the constitution." Id. at 229, 239, 240, 242.
23. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Court in Arlington Heights reaffirmed the Washington v. Davis
principle that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact." The Court also outlined some of the "subjects of proper inquiry" to be
reviewed in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed. Id. at 252, 264, 268.
24. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). In Keyes, the Court held:
[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a
school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within
the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful
segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden
4
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The Court expressed confidence that the district court, in rendering
its decision, was fully aware that plaintiffs seeking to establish proof of
an equal protection violation based on racial discrimination must show
a discriminatory purpose, and that plaintiffs are required by Keyes to
prove not only that segregated schooling existed, but also that it was
brought about and maintained by intentional state action. The Court
also stated that it was confident that the district court recognized that
disparate impact and foreseeable consequences alone do not establish a
constitutional violation, but are only examples of the kinds of proof
from which an inference of segregative intent may be drawn. Thus, the
district court's conclusions of law were consistent with Court precedent,
and because there were no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judg-
ment was affirmed.25
THE DA.YToN II CASE
In Dayton II, a companion case that also originated in Ohio, the
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals, which ruled that a dual system existed in Dayton at
the time of Brown I, and ordered a systemwide remedy.26 The action
in Dayton I & II was filed by students in the Dayton, Ohio school sys-
tem in 1972. They alleged that the Dayton Board of Education, the
State Board of Education, and various local and state officials were op-
erating a racially segregated school system in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 7 In 1972-73, the
twenty-five white schools in the system all had 90% or more white at-
tendance; this was the same percentage ratio reported in 1963-64 and in
1951-52. By comparison, every school that was 90% or more black in
1951-52, 1963-64, or 1971-72 was still 90% or more black at the time of
trial.28
The Dayton case had a long and unrelenting history of litigation.
Before ultimately being decided in 1979, it made four round trips
through the federal courts" and was decided twice by the Supreme
of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intention-
ally segregative actions ...
In discharging that burden, it is not enough, of course, that the school authorities rely upon
some allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions. Their burden is to ad-
duce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the factors
that motivated their actions.
Id. at 208-10.
25. 443 U.S. at 463-68.
26. Id. at 534 (quoting 583 F.2d at 243).
27. 583 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting 503 F.2d 684, 694-95).
28. 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
29. 583 F.2d 243 (1978); 561 F.2d 652 (1977); 539 F.2d 1084 (1976); 518 F.2d 853 (1975);
Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (1977).
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Court of the United States.3" On its fourth trip through the lower fed-
eral courts (after remand from the Supreme Court in Dayton 1), the
district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden
of proving a constitutional violation and dismissed the complaint.3
The plaintiffs, as one of their assignments of error, argued to the court
of appeals that the district court had ignored the principle that if the
Board was operating a dual system at the time of Brown I, it had an
affirmative duty to eliminate the systemwide effects of its prior acts of
segregation.32 This same court had just two months earlier listened to
this same argument in the Columbus case. Several months later, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this affirmative duty doctrine in
Dayton II and Columbus and ordered a systemwide remedy in each
instance.33
Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court,34 delivered an opinion
which was essentially a repetition of the basic reasoning of Columbus.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that the Day-
ton Board of Education had operated a racially segregated dual system
at the time of Brown I, and that the evidence in the record clearly and
convincingly established that the Board had failed to eliminate the con-
tinuing, systemwide effect of its prior discrimination.35 Arguably, the
Court should have had a more difficult task reaching the same result in
this case as it did in Columbus because it was bound by its own prece-
dent in Dayton I, advising the district court on remand to determine
how much increased segregative effect the Board's violations had on
the current racial distribution of the Dayton school population, com-
pared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional
violations. 36 The district court had interpreted this ruling as requiring
plaintiffs to prove what effect each individual act of discrimination had
on current patterns of segregation.37 Justice White reasoned that this
30. 443 U.S. 526 (1979); 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
31. 446 F. Supp. at 1253.
32. 583 F.2d at 246-47.
33. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787, 818 (6th Cir. 1978).
34. Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526.
35. Id. at 526-27, 537-40.
36. 433 U.S. at 420:
The duty of both the [d]istrict [clourt and the [clourt of [aippeals in a case such as this,
where mandatory segregation by law of the races in the schools has long ceased, is to first
determine whether there was any action[s] in the conduct of the business of the School Board
which are intended to, and did in fact discriminate against minority pupils, teachers or
staff. . . . If such violations are found, the Idlistrict [clourt in the first instance, subject to
review by the [clourt of [a]ppeals, must determine how much incremental segregative effect
these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently
constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of
such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and
only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy.
37. 446 F. Supp. at 1253.
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interpretation resulted from a misunderstanding of Dayton ,38 but he
failed to reconcile the Court's rulings in the two cases-Dayton I and
Dayton II.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, explained why they concurred in Columbus and dissented in
Dayton II. Both Justices believed that the critical difference between
the two cases was that the court of appeals in Dayton I (contrary to
Columbus) had ignored the crucial fact-finding role of federal district
courts in school desegregation litigation.39 They also believed that in
each case the Supreme Court had attached far too much importance to
the question of whether there existed a dual system in 1954. Justice
Stewart argued that the duty of a school district to remedy a consitu-
tional violation existing in 1954 does not justify shifting the burden of
proof in a case in the 1970's. 40 In addressing the question of whether
plaintiffs showed that racial separation was the result of intentional sys-
temwide discrimination, Justice Stewart distinguished the Dayton II
and Columbus cases on several grounds: (1) that the court of appeals
overturned the district court's judgment in Dayton, but not in Colum-
bus; (2) that the evidence of recent discriminatory intent lacking in
Dayton II was relatively strong in Columbus; and (3) that the plaintiffs
in the Columbus case, unlike those in Dayton II, established a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination which the Board did not re-
but.
4 1
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger agreed with
portions of the dissenting opinions of Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
He, like Justice Rehnquist, had serious doubts about how many of the
post-1954 actions of the two school boards could be characterized as
segregative in intent and effect, but he, like Justice Stewart, felt com-
pelled to yield to the decision of the trier of fact because the errors did
not rise to the level of "clearly erroneous. "42
Justice Powell joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, but
wrote separately to emphasize several points. He expressed concern
that the Court had endorsed a totally new constitutional concept appli-
38. 443 U.S. at 540-41.
39. Id. at 468-70. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dayton II reversed the judgment of
the district court. 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 472:
Much has changed in 25 years in the Nation at large and in Dayton and Columbus in
particular. . . . The prejudices of the school board of 1954 (and earlier) cannot realistically
be assumed to haunt the school boards of today. . . . It is unrealistic to assume that the hand
of 1954 plays any major part in shaping the current school system in either city.
41. Id. at 541.
42. Id. at 468. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of wit-
nesses .. ." FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
7
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cable to school desegregation cases, and that the Court seemed to be
expanding, rather than limiting, judicial control over the operation of
public schools. He felt convinced that the Court was condoning the
"creation of bad constitutional law."' 4 3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist was strongly critical of
the logic and reasoning set forth in the majority opinion. He asserted
that the school desegregation remedy imposed in Columbus was as
complete and dramatic a displacement of local autonomy by the judici-
ary as is possible in our federal system. This local autonomy, he added,
has historically been viewed as essential to the maintenance of commu-
nity concerns, the support for public schools, and the quality of the
educational process. The district court and court of appeals, he in-
sisted, had no concrete notion of what a systemwide violation is, or how
to ascertain whether one exists, and the Supreme Court's relegation of
responsibility to these courts to determine the presence of such viola-
tions and the scope of the remedy is likely to cause confusion and mis-
application of the prevailing law.an
Justice Rehnquist attacked the Court's logic in emphasizing 1954 vi-
olations as "benchmarks" in order to justify current systemwide reme-
dies, insisting that "as a matter of history, case law, or logic, there is
nothing to support the novel proposition that the primary inquiry in
school desegregation cases involving systems without a history of statu-
torily mandated racial assignments is what happened in those systems
before 1954." 45 Moreover, he added, if a district court concludes that
there was a dual system at the time of Brown I, this constitutes an ir-
rebuttable presumption, and a school board's failure to take every af-
firmative step to integrate the system would amount to a constitutional
violation, irrespective of whether there is a causal nexus between those
pre-1954 violations and current segregation.
4 6
To Justice Rehnquist, the Court's analysis of 1954 violations marked
a departure from established doctrines of causation and discriminatory
purpose. He cautioned that objective evidence should be carefully ana-
lyzed, for it may reduce the discriminatory purpose requirement of
Washington v. Davis to a discriminatory impact test. Following the
lower court's methodology, he insisted, would eliminate all distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation and would render school sys-
43. 443 U.S. at 480.
44. Id. at 489-90.
45. Id. at 500. Justice Rehnquist suggested that if a year must serve as a "benchmark" upon
which to predicate equal protection violations in the school context, that 1973 would be a better
year because in that year the Court in Keyes was "first confronted with the problem of school
segregation in the context of systems without a history of statutorily mandated separation of the
races." Id.
46. Id. at 493.
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1980], Art. 10
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol12/iss1/10
PRO VING SEGREGATIVE INTENT
tems captives of their remote past.4"
ANALYSIS
What is the state of the law in school desegregation cases after Co-
lumbus and Dayton II? These cases will probably be debated in years
to come, but at this point it seems clear that all plaintiffs may employ
the same test, regardless of where the action is brought, or whether the
action did or did not originate in a district having a history of statuto-
rily mandated segregation in 1954. All plaintiffs may prove segregative
intent by showing that in 1954, when Brown I was decided, the defend-
ant board was not operating a racially neutral, unitary school system,
but was purposefully operating segregative, dual schools which had
originally caused and later perpetuated racial isolation; and that since
the Brown II decision the board had been under a continuous, affirma-
tive duty to disestablish its dual system, but had failed to discharge this
duty. Moreover, it makes no difference whether segregated schooling
was compelled by state law or not, so long as plaintiffs can show that
the public schools were officially segregated by race in 1954.48
The doctrines of Columbus and Dayton II explicitly encompass those
cases where plaintiffs can prove that a school board's actions and poli-
cies were motivated by segregative intent in 1954. But do they apply to
those cases where proof of intentional or de jure segregation dates back
to a year subsequent to 1954, or would they apply to a school system
which was not in existence in 1954? The logical answer is "yes" in light
of the Court's application of Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton Ij.49
The Keyes presumption is predicated on the concept of space, not
time. It stands for the proposition that where plaintiffs show that inten-
tional or de jure segregation exists in a meaningful portion of a school
system, the burden of proof shifts to the school authorities to show that
other or subsequent actions and policies in other parts of the system
having segregative impact are not also motivated by an intent to segre-
gate.50 Columbus and Dayton II, on the contrary, are predicated on the
concept of time. They stand for the proposition that where plaintiffs
can prove that intentional, de jure segregation existed in a school sys-
tem at the time Brown I was decided in 1954, the school board was
automatically charged (as of 1954) with an affirmative duty to effectu-
ate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. When
47. Id. at 491. Justice Rehnquist suggested that by affirming the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in this case, the approach taken lends itself to the possibility of differing remedies
imposed on similar school systems because of the predilections of individual judges.
48. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
49. 443 U.S. at 467, 537.
50. 413 U.S. at 200.
9
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Keyes is combined with the doctrines of Columbus and Dayton II, the
concepts of space and time are also combined. Consequently, if a
plaintiff can prove that a school board's actions and policies in recent
times have had segregative impact, he can still establish a prima facie
case by either (1) proving that the present segregative impact is causally
related to the board's intentional segregative policies and actions that
were in operation in 1954, or (2) proving that the present actions and
policies of the board, although only segregative in effect, are part of an
unlawful segregative pattern on the part of the school authorities and
that they have pursued an intentional segregative policy in a substan-
tial portion of that school district.5'
The question left open by Keyes, which forms the underlying basis
for both Columbus and Dayton II, is what is meant by "meaningful
portion" or "substantial portion." Plaintiffs in Columbus and Dayton
II presented evidence of intentional segregative policies in portions of
both school districts. In Dayton II, the district court ruled that these
were isolated instances of intentional segregation.5 2 The district court
in Columbus, however, allowed evidence of official acts of intentional
segregation existing at the time of Brown I as proof of "substantial"
acts of segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system justify-
ing a systemwide remedy.53 Viewed in this light, Columbus and Dayton
11 reaffirmed the basic rationale of the Keyes doctrine and also ex-
tended its application by making proof easier to ascertain.
In their dissenting opinions, Justices Powell and Rehnquist asserted
that the Court ignored the principles and precedents of Davis and Ar-
lington Heights, neither of which were school desegregation cases. Da-
vis is significant here, however, because the Supreme Court ruled for
the first time that proof of a discriminatory purpose is required to show
a violation under the equal protection clause. The Court ruled that a
law or other official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact.54 Neither case set forth a precise
formula for proving discriminatory purpose. Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that the focus of inquiry in cases such as Columbus and Dayton
II is whether a desire to separate the races is among the reasons for a
school board's decision to pursue a particular course of action.55 He
further suggested that "[t]he best evidence on this score would be a
contemporaneous explanation of its action by the school board. ... 1
Most of the plaintiffs in school desegregation cases would probably dis-
51. 443 U.S. at 465-68.
52. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (1977).
53. 429 F. Supp. 229 (1977).
54. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977).
55. 443 U.S. at 509.
56. Id.
10
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agree, because school boards can be much too sophisticated to place on
record any type of evidence that could possibly be used against them in
a school desegregation suit.
In both Columbus57 and Dayton Ijf Justice Rehnquist specifically
charged that the Court's cascade of presumptions has totally eliminated
all distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. To determine
the validity of this charge, it is necessary to examine these two doctrines
from a historical standpoint. When Brown I was decided, the distinc-
tion was consistent with the limited constitutional rationale of that
case--de jure segregation was that form of segregation which resulted
from state imposed classification of the races.59 Logically then, de facto
segregation was that kind of segregation which resulted from neighbor-
hood housing patterns and official acts and omissions, in the absence of
state laws compelling separation of the races.6 °
The Brown II doctrine was construed for many years as requiring
only state neutrality, allowing freedom of choice as to which schools to
attend so long as the state itself assured that the choice was free from
restraint.6 A critical question not decided was whether freedom of
choice was an end in itself, constituting compliance with the school
board's obligation to establish a unitary, nonracial system, thereby
eliminating all vestiges of de jure segregation. This issue came before
the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board,62 a case arising
out of a rural setting in Kent County, Virginia, where blacks and
whites were dispersed in fairly equal numbers. After three years in op-
57. Id. at 491.
58. Id. at 542.
59. 347 U.S. at 486-88. The Brown I opinion represented a consolidation of four cases from
four different states-Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware. In each case black chil-
dren sought the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community
on a nonsegregated basis. In each case, they had been denied admission to schools attended by
white children under laws of their states which required or permitted segregation according to
race.
60. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970). In this case the district
court found that certain actions of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board were discriminatory,
and that residential patterns in the city and county resulting in part from federal, state, and local
government action resulted in segregated education. The Court held, inter alia, that the district
court could properly take affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones
in order to achieve nondiscriminatory assignments of students. The Court also affirmed the dis-
trict court's order requiring additional busing as a tool to enhance desegregation. Id. at 27-31.
61. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The school system consisted of two
schools, one black and one white. At the time of the suit a black student had never attended the
white school nor a white student the black school. The freedom of choice plan adopted by the
school board was found to be unacceptable because it offered no real promise of achieving a
unitary, nonracial school system. The Court concluded that a freedom of choice plan in a school
system such as this and in the absence of other efforts at desegregation, was not sufficient to
provide the remedy mandated by Brown I. Id. at 441-42. See also Raney v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 433, 438, 443 (1968).
62. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
11
Balance: The Impact of Columbus Board of Education v. Penick and Dayton Bo
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
eration, the freedom of choice plan was not working. The racial com-
position of previously all-black schools was still 100% black, while only
15% of the blacks had chosen to attend white schools. Yet, the school
board maintained that they had complied with their obligations to de-
segregate. The Court identified the freedom of choice program as a
subterfuge, and declared that Brown II clearly charged school boards
operating a dual system with "the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."63 The extent to
which this affirmative duty might apply to a large city setting with ex-
tensive areas of residential patterns of segregation, presenting problems
and calling for solutions vastly different from those in Green, was un-
answered by this decision.
A few years later, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion64 partially answered the questions left open in Green. The Court
ruled that federal district courts have wide remedial discretion in the
field of desegregation and that they do not abuse it by requiring major
restructuring of attendance zones along with reasonable busing. Thus,
the Court imposed upon a large metropolitan area-Charlotte, North
Carolina-the affirmative duty to eliminate segregation in the schools,
and also approved the use of busing to achieve this end.65 In so ruling,
the Court was requiring districts to alleviate conditions which in large
part did not result from historic state-imposed de jure segregation, but
from segregated residential and migratory patterns. Hence, the Court
all but eliminated any logical distinction left between de facto and de
jure segregation. The Court viewed the issue presented in Swann as a
national, not just a southern problem. Justice Powell argued these
points in his concurring opinion in Keyes66 and again, along with Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Columbus and Dayton I 67
The crucial question, however, is not whether there is any distinction
left between de facto and de jure segregation, but what the merging of
these two doctrines would mean in school desegregation litigation.
Powell urged that "[t]he principal reason for abandonment of the de
jure/de facto distinction is that, in view of the evolution of the holding
of Brown I into the affirmative-duty doctrine, the distinction no longer
can be justified on a principled basis . . and that it also operates
inequitably on communities in different sections of the country.68
Despite criticisms, case law has continued to distinguish between de
63. Id. at 437-38.
64. 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
65. Id. at 29-31.
66. 413 U.S. at 217-36.
67. 443 U.S. at 481-82.
68. 413 U.S. at 224, 229.
230
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facto and de jure segregation. For example, in Keyes, the Court rea-
soned that "plaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling
exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional
state action."69 Several years later the Supreme Court, in Davis, ruled
for the first time that a law or other official act is not unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact; there must be a
purpose or intent to segregate.70
The full impact of Columbus and Dayton II is probably yet to be felt.
At present, it appears that the underlying rationale of the Court's hold-
ings encompasses two distinct theories-the Brown II "affirmative
duty" theory and the Davis "purposeful discrimination" requirement.
It is not explicitly clear from the opinion whether the Court based its
holdings on one or both of these theories. Close scrutiny of the district
court's analysis seems to indicate that both theories were incorporated
in its decision. It relied upon the Brown I holding for the proposition
that segregation is a denial of equal protection of the laws,7 and upon
Brown I1 and Green to support the proposition that once de jure segre-
gation is found, school boards are under a continuing affirmative duty
to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segre-
gation.7"
Thus, if a plaintiff can prove that a school board was intentionally
operating a dual system of segregated schooling in 1954, this gives rise
to a presumption that the intentional segregation has continued to exist
until recent times. School boards are thereby saddled with the burden
of proving that current racially separate education is not the result of
their failure to eliminate the consequences of past intentionally segre-
gative policies.73 Once a plaintiff proves segregative intent in the offi-
cial acts and policies of the board in the pre-1954 years, he must go one
step further and show that in the intervening years there have been a
series of board actions and practices that have intentionally aggravated
racial separation in the schools. From the Court's analysis, it appears
that in order for plaintiffs to prove this, they need only show that the
board had not followed a "racially neutral" policy, but had intention-
ally chosen alternatives which were predictably segregative and from
which it was reasonable to infer segregative intent.74
In Columbus, the plaintiffs established satisfactory proof of recent
segregative intent by evidence of the Board's approval of optional at-
69. Id. at 198.
70. 426 U.S. at 239.
71. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 483, 495 (1954).
72. Brown I1, 349 U.S. at 300; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
73. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
74. 443 U.S. at 454-63.
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tendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas, and boundary changes
which had the effect of maintaining and enhancing racial imbalance in
the schools. The court of appeals was persuaded by the fact that the
Board had repeatedly been warned of the consequences of its actions
and had still abjured workable suggestions for improving racial bal-
ance.75 The court of appeals' opinion, however, seems to indicate that
a lesser degree of proof of intent to segregate would have been suffi-
cient. It stated that the Columbus pupil assignment figures for the
1975-76 school year alone would have been enough to establish that the
Board had not met its continuing constitutional duty to desegregate the
schools.76 Thus, in Columbus and Dayton II, the Davis requirement
was satisfied.
Another question that must be considered is how the Keyes doctrine
fits into the Brown II "affirmative duty" theory and the Davis "pur-
poseful discrimination" requirement. Arguably, it could be incorpo-
rated on two levels. First plaintiffs must prove the existence of de jure
segregation at the time of Brown 1. If sufficient proof is produced at
this level, the Keyes doctrine may be applied for the following proposi-
tion:
[Where] a policy of intentional segregation has been proved with re-
spect to a significant portion of the school system, the burden is on the
school authorities (regardless of claims that their neighborhood school
policy was racially neutral) to prove that their actions as to other segre-
gated schools in the system were not likewise motivated by a segrega-
tive intent.
77
Thus, the Keyes doctrine, when combined with the doctrine of Brown
II, places school boards as of 1954 under a continuing affirmative duty
to either eliminate racial separation systemwide (not just in that
"meaningful" portion of the school system where de jure segregation
has been proven to exist), or present sufficient evidence that segregative
intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions.
Furthermore, the Keyes doctrine can be applied to lend credence to
plaintiffs' prima facie case of a current dual school system in precisely
the same manner as set forth above. Once the plaintiff shows sufficient
acts and omissions in the policies and practices of a school board hav-
ing the purpose and effect of aggravating and perpetuating racial sepa-
ration, the Keyes doctrine could again be invoked to support a
systemwide remedy.
75. 583 F.2d at 795.
76. Id. at 800.
77. 413 U.S. at 208-09.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's rulings in Columbus and Dayton II represent
both a reaffirmation and an extension of the Keyes doctrine. Contrary
to what some of the dissenters had to say, this was not a drastic change
in the course of the law; it merely represents an extension of the law as
applied to northern desegregation cases. Southern school boards have
been laboring under a continuing affirmative duty to eliminate all ves-
tiges of intentional segregation "root and branch" since Brown II."
BERNADINE S. BALLANCE
78. 349 U.S. at 299. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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